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Abstract In this paper we analyse the extent to which perceptions of the govern-
ment’s role in the economic crisis impacted on the political behaviour of European
citizens. This includes contentious political activities such as attending public
meetings, participating in demonstrations, and joining strikes, but also electoral
behaviour in the form of voting against the incumbent. We examine data from 2015
since it allows us to examine European nations experiencing different economic
conditions as a result of the 2008 financial crisis and the subsequent period of
recession. We find that individuals who blamed the national government for the
economic crisis and who were more unsatisfied with the government’s handling of
unemployment were more likely to participate. However, the effect of these vari-
ables varied across different forms of political behaviour. Moreover, the study
provides evidence that the effect of the perceptions of one’s own economic situation
on political behaviour is conditional upon the perceptions people have of the way in
which the government is dealing with the situation, and specifically with unem-
ployment, a key marker of the extent of the negative effects of the economic crisis
across European nations.
Keywords Political behaviour  Economic perceptions  Blame assignment 
Economic adversity  Policy-oriented evaluations
& Marco Giugni
marco.giugni@unige.ch
Maria T. Grasso
m.grasso@sheffield.ac.uk
1 Department of Political Science and International Relations, University of Geneva, Boulevard
du Pont-d’Arve 40, 1211 Geneva, Switzerland
2 Department of Politics, University of Sheffield, Elmfield, Northumberland Road,
Sheffield S10 2TU, UK
Acta Polit
https://doi.org/10.1057/s41269-017-0073-x
Introduction
The economic crisis starting in 2008 has led to unemployment growth and shrinking
GDP across Europe. About 10 years since its onset, there is great variation in the
economic conditions of different countries in Europe. In countries where the crisis
hit hardest, Greece and Spain, unemployment is still well over 20%. On the other
hand, where the crisis only had mild effects, as in Germany and Switzerland, it is
under 5%. In the UK and Poland, GDP grew at 2.6 and 3.4%, respectively, whereas
in Italy the economy shrunk by 0.4% in 2014. Previous research has shown that the
economic downturn affected citizens’ support for government intervention (Mal-
hotra and Margalit 2010; Margalit 2013; Popp and Rudolph 2011) and fuelled
political protests and a variety of social movements (Bennett 2012; Skocpol and
Williamson 2013). Particularly in those countries worst hit, large protests took place
as European governments were blamed for the negative economic context (Giugni
and Grasso 2015a, 2017a). What were the ways in which European citizens aimed to
make their voices heard and criticise government handling of the crisis? Which
types of citizens disengaged while others engaged in a variety of political activities?
Political science literature has long shown how voters use their judgment about
circumstances around them to hold politicians accountable (Fiorina 1981) as well as
that citizens use a wide array of institutional and non-institutional modes of
engagement (Grasso 2018; Pattie et al. 2004). However, research has tended to
either focus on understanding the causes for voter turnout (Lewis-Beck and
Stegmaier 2000, 2007; Lewis-Beck and Paldam 2000; Lewis-Beck 1988) or looking
at other more contentious political activities such as participating in protests or
engaging in social movement activism (Bernburg 2015; Grasso and Giugni 2016b;
Ru¨dig and Karyotis 2013). Moreover, most studies of political participation tend to
focus on the classic sociological explanations of participation (Brady et al. 1995;
Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980), disregarding the effects of political attitudes and
economic perceptions, blame assignment, and policy-related approval. An effort to
fill both gaps has recently been made by Levin et al. (2015) in their study on
California before the 2010 General Election. These authors have shown the impact
of perceptions of economic conditions, policy-oriented evaluations, and blame
assignment on involvement in a variety of political activities. In this paper, we take
a broader comparative perspective in analysing the extent to which perceptions of
the government’s role in the economic crisis impacted on different forms of political
behaviour of European citizens. We focus in particular on different types of political
expressions of dissatisfaction with the current situation, from more mainstream to
more confrontational types of political actions: voting against the incumbent,
attending public meetings, participating in demonstrations, and participating in
strikes. Although voting against the incumbent is not always the result of
dissatisfaction with performance rather than a more proactive support of an
alternative party or candidate, the four types of political behaviour analysed in this
study can all be theorised as at least potential political expressions of dissatisfaction
with the current state of things.
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We are particularly interested in examining the impact of two kinds of predictors
of political behaviour in the context of economic crisis stressed by previous
research: evaluations of the way in which the government deals with one of the most
politicised aspects of the crisis—namely unemployment—and blame assignment,
more precisely attributing blame for the country’s economic difficulties to the
government. The latter two aspects in particular capture people’s perceptions of the
role of the government in the crisis. We suggest, first, that government performance
evaluations and blame assignment have a differential effect on distinct forms of
political behaviour. Second, we suggest that the way in which people frame the
crisis - in terms of blame assignment and satisfaction with the way the government
is dealing with it - conditions the effect of the perceptions of one’s own economic
situation on political behaviour. In addition to investigating the main effects of these
two predictors, therefore, we focus our analysis also on the way in which they
interact with feelings of relative deprivation.
We focus on nine European countries and analyse data collected by means of an
original survey in 2015. These countries shared the experience of the economic
crisis to different degrees. Most countries suffered polarisation over disagreements
on how to handle the economy and whether to introduce austerity policies or not.
Moreover, in some countries voters punished incumbents. At a time where the
political context is rife with diverse sources of dissatisfaction, the drivers of political
participation may differ in relevant ways between different types of political actions
as well as across different kinds of citizens. Exploring these dynamics in a
comparative context leads to our paper’s novel contribution to existing research.
More specifically, we aim to add to the existing literature on political behaviour in
three ways. First, we examine the effect of perceptions of the government’s role in
the economic crisis on different forms of political behaviour, from the more
mainstream to the more confrontational, hence allowing for a differentiated
approach to the study of political behaviour. Second and relatedly, we study these
effects across electoral and non-electoral forms of political behaviour. These aspects
have been widely studied in previous research with respect to voting behaviour
(Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2000, 2007; Lewis-Beck and Paldam 2000; Lewis-Beck
1988), but not so much in the context of non-institutionalised forms of political
participation. Thus, we heed recent calls to bridge the gap between the study of
electoral politics and that of protest politics (Heaney and Rojas 2014; Hutter 2014;
Kriesi 2014; McAdam and Tarrow 2010). Third, continuing a research agenda we
begun elsewhere (Giugni and Grasso 2016), we aim to disentangle the way in which
deprivation interacts with individual perceptions on the broader political and
economic environment to impact on political behaviour in times of crisis. In this
paper specifically, we aim to examine how evaluations of the way in which the
government deals with unemployment and blame assignment condition the impact
of relative deprivation, developing our understanding of the decision to become
politically active.
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Previous research and hypotheses
The literature on the impact of the economy on political activity is extensive but
often narrowly focused (Levin et al. 2015). Economic voting theory suggests that
individuals reward incumbents when the economy is doing well but punish them
when the economy is doing badly (Duch 2007; Hellwig 2010; Lewis-Beck and
Paldam 2000; Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2000, 2007). Studies have examined both
‘‘pocketbook’’ evaluations of one’s own individual or household concerns,
including unemployment or whether one struggles to make ends meet and more
‘‘sociotropic’’ concerns about economic adversity affecting one’s community or
nation, including dissatisfaction with the state of the economy, unemployment, or
inflation (Lewis-Beck 1988). By and large, the literature has found very little
evidence of a relationship between individual economic problems and voting
(Kinder and Kiewiet 1979; Kiewiet 1983; Alvarez and Nagler 1995; Lewis-Beck
and Stegmaier 2000).
On the other hand, studies have found that macroeconomic conditions as well as
evaluations of how the incumbent has handled the economy do affect voter choice
(Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2000, 2007; Lewis-Beck and Paldam 2000; Lewis-Beck
1988). This seems at odds with the availability of information: individuals are much
more likely to be privy to facts about their own or their household’s economic
situation than the national economy or government handling of it (Lohmann 1994).
Some have explained it by suggesting that the reward–punishment hypothesis only
works under conditions where individuals assign responsibility to the government
for the situation or think that the government should solve it (Feldman 1982). It also
appears that individuals are less likely to hold government responsible for their own
economic conditions but more likely to see government responsible for the national
economic context (Brody and Sniderman 1977). Kaase and Marsh (1979) had
already noted how feelings of deprivation become politicised only where problems
appear collectively shared and when political authorities can be blamed or held
responsible for the problem.
While the literature had distinguished between pocketbook and sociotropic
concerns, it could be perhaps that citizens focus their gaze on specific aspects of the
economy such as unemployment or poverty alleviation, rewarding or punishing
incumbents depending on how they feel that they have dealt with that specific
aspect—thus applying a sort of ‘‘policy-oriented economic voting’’ (Kiewiet 1983;
Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2000). However, even among studies examining
economic perceptions on voting there has not been much work done to analyse the
effect of evaluations of action in specific areas (Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2000).
While scholars study the impact of economic issue preferences—i.e. support for
intervention in the economy—it is rarer to find studies of policies or government
actions.
In a context of different levels of crisis, examining data from different European
countries in 2015 allows us to examine the effect of evaluations of government
action on unemployment specifically, perhaps the most politicised negative
consequence of the current crisis. The economy has come back as one of the
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main concerns of European publics with the economic crisis. Many European
countries were still in dire economic conditions by 2015, particularly those Southern
European countries hardest hit by the crisis. In such a situation, levels of support for
government tend to fall as they come to be blamed and held responsible for a
negative economic context. Government responsibility for economic problems can
be understood in different ways: for causing the problem, failing to solve it, or
performing at sub-standard level (Iyengar 1991; Peffley 1984; Brody and Snider-
man 1977). Blame assignment for economic problems could vary across countries
as a function of the different economic conditions and whether one’s preferred party
is in power. Blame assignment is understood here to have an impact on political
participation since it politicises political evaluations (Iyengar 1991; Peffley 1984;
Sniderman and Brody 1977) and allows voter to engage in rational retrospective
voting (Feldman 1982; Iyengar 1991). Moreover, by connecting personal and social
problems to political judgments, blame assignment can act as a psychological cue
with profound influences (Iyengar 1991), including on political behaviour.
This leads us to our first hypothesis:
H1 Dissatisfaction with the way the government is dealing with unemployment
and blaming the national government for the nation’s economic difficulties should
spur political participation (direct-effect hypothesis).
While previous research has focused on the impact of evaluations of government
performance and blame assignment on voting behaviour, little if any work has been
done on how they affect other less institutionalised forms of participation. In our
study, we also test for their effect on three further types of activities, namely
attending public meetings, participating in demonstrations, and participating in
strikes. Given the lack of previous work on these non-electoral forms of
participation, we lack a firm ground upon which we can anchor specific hypotheses.
However, given the different logics followed by these more contentious forms of
political action as opposed to electoral behaviour, we expect perceptions of the
government role in the economic crisis to vary across these types of political
behaviour. In particular, we suggest that the impact of such perceptions should be
stronger when it comes to electoral behaviour and, more specifically, for voting
against the incumbent in the context of the crisis. The rationale behind this
expectation is that the effect of such behaviour most directly affects those whom the
people hold as responsible for the situation.
This leads us to our second hypothesis:
H2 The effect of dissatisfaction with the way the government is dealing with
unemployment and blame assignment should be strongest for voting against the
incumbent since here the effect of the action will most directly punish the
perceived culprits (differential-effect hypothesis).
Our first two hypotheses deal with the direct impact of evaluations of the
government role in the economic crisis on different types of political behaviour. We
would like to add a third hypothesis concerning the interaction of such evaluations
with the way individuals perceive their own economic situation. Particularly in the
collective behaviour tradition, relative deprivation theory has typically stressed the
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role of individual grievances and hardship for political behaviour (Davies 1962;
Geschwender 1968; Gurr 1970). Subjective perceptions of relative deprivation have
been shown to be important in particular for mobilisation to contentious political
action (Klandermans et al. 2008), but they are also likely to matter for other forms
of expression of political dissatisfaction (Thomassen 1989). The recent economic
crisis has revamped this research tradition and led to a number of studies testing the
hypothesis that feelings of relative deprivation lead to an increase in protest
activities (Grasso and Giugni 2016b; Ru¨dig and Karyotis 2013; Bernburg 2015).
We suggest that the impact of relative deprivation and, more generally,
perceptions of one’s own economic situation on political behaviour is conditional
upon the perceptions of the government role in the economic crisis. More
specifically, dissatisfaction with the way the government is dealing with
unemployment and blame assignment are expected to condition the effect of
relative deprivation on the four kinds of political behaviour under investigation. A
recent study (Grasso and Giugni 2016b) has shown that the impact of individual
subjective feelings of deprivation is conditional on contextual macroeconomic and
policy factors. This study found that, while individual-level relative deprivation has
a direct effect on the propensity to have protested in the last year, this effect is
greater under certain macroeconomic and political conditions. By the same token,
we may expect perceptions of such macroeconomic and political conditions to play
a similar role.
This leads us to our third hypothesis:
H3 Dissatisfaction with the way the government is dealing with unemployment
and blame assignment should have a conditional effect on the relationship between
relative deprivation and political behaviour, increasing its effect on participation
(conditional-effect hypothesis).
In sum, we expect blame assignment and dissatisfaction with the way the
government is dealing with unemployment to play an important role for explaining
individuals’ engagement in different types of political activities, both directly and
indirectly through their conditional effect on the relationship between relative
deprivation and political behaviour. Further, we expect these two variables to have a
greater or lesser impact depending on the specific form of political behaviour at
hand, with expected differences between more mainstream and more confronta-
tional forms of political behaviour.
Data and methods
We use data from an original cross-national survey (N = 18,370) fielded in 2015 in
the context of the ‘Living with Hard Times’ (LIVEWHAT) project funded by the
European Commission under the auspices of their 7th Framework Programme. The
survey was conducted by YouGov in each of the nine European countries included
in the project: France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Poland, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
and the UK. Samples were matched to national statistics for age, gender, region, and
education. Since the crisis impacted on the countries to different extents, we also
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include macro-level data from the World Bank on unemployment and GDP growth
as well as from the OECD on government social spending and tax wedges as level 2
variables. Descriptive statistics for all the variables are presented in Table 1. Once
all missing values are removed, the final sample is 17,667 (Ns for each country are
reported in Table 2).
We examine four dependent variables in this study. The first is a dichotomous
variable for whether respondents intend to vote for the incumbent party or coalition
if there were an election tomorrow. We coded 0 all those who intended to vote for
the incumbent and as 1 those who expressed alternative vote choices. The other
three dependent variables are measures of participation based on dichotomous
variables measuring whether someone had participated in various political activities
in the last 12 months. Specifically, we look at attending public meetings,
participating in demonstrations, and participating in strikes.
Past research has shown that protest participation has distinct features to other
types of political action that could reasonably be classed in the ‘unconventional’
Table 1 Variable descriptive statistics
Mean SD Min Max
Intends to vote against incumbent 0.7089489 0.45426 0 1
Attended meeting last 12 months 0.0965642 0.295372 0 1
Participated in demonstration last 12 months 0.1110545 0.314209 0 1
Joined strike last 12 months 0.0558669 0.229671 0 1
Age (mean) 44.81876 14.81204 18 88
Male 0.4720666 0.499233 0 1
Education (low) 0.2406181 0.427471 0 1
Manual occupation 0.2377314 0.425706 0 1
Unemployed 0.1172242 0.321696 0 1
Political interest 0.6431199 0.479093 0 1
Internal political efficacy 0.4939341 0.397554 0 1
External political efficacy 0.4792929 0.358678 0 1
Party attachment 2.529349 1.025088 1 4
Left–right values 5.239254 1.842704 0 10
Libertarian–authoritarian values 4.465347 1.878585 0 10
Organisational memberships 1.253241 2.383205 0 12
Unemployment rate 2014 11.92683 7.752418 4.5 26.5
GDP growth 2014 1.525811 1.124696 - 0.4 3.4
Social spending 2014 25.20028 3.878119 19.4 31.9
Tax wedge 2014 39.83403 8.466294 22.25 49.3
Relative deprivation 0.4540669 0.4979 0 1
Unsatisfied how government deals with unemployment 0.8001924 0.399867 0 1
Blames government for economic difficulties 0.4829909 0.499725 0 1
Disproportionality index 9.537392 5.579571 1.25 17.66
N 17,667
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realm (Grasso 2014). As such one alternative is to not create scales of activities but
rather focus on this ‘modal’ expression (Tarrow 1996) of social movement
activism—particularly as exhibited by the anti-austerity demonstrations taking place
as a result of the crisis. Constructing scales of activities has been applied in studies
of participation but these could be problematic, particularly at the cross-national
level, and adequate checks must be applied in order to ensure they do not confound
very different types of political action (Grasso 2013, 2016a). Moreover, some
actions such as petitioning are in some countries even more popular than voting,
whereas other forms such as occupying are practised in most European countries
only by very tiny fractions of the population (Grasso 2011, 2016b). In this study we
therefore opted for measuring protest participation by looking at specific political
activities separately. Moreover, since we want to understand the impact of the
economic context in 2014 on participation in 2015, we limited the indicators to
participation in the last year. On the other hand, for voting the question asked which
respondents would vote for if there were an election tomorrow, i.e. future intention
to vote. Table 2 shows the proportion of individuals that said they had participated
in the various activities in each country or that said they would not vote for the
incumbent if there was an election tomorrow. Table 2 also shows that there is
reasonable variation. Part of the variation appears to be related to the severity and
extent of the crisis. Countries where the crisis had deeper effects such as Greece saw
greater levels of protest activism.
Our key independent variable for subjective feelings of relative deprivation is
retrospective to the last 5 years so that the deterioration of conditions relative to
expectations should have at least begun to occur prior to political behaviour in the
last 12 months and as such the time-ordering of independent and dependent
variables respects the requirements of causality. This question asks respondents
whether they felt that the economic situation of their household was much better or
much worse than it was 5 years ago. We dichotomise this measure following
previous research (Ru¨dig and Karyotis 2013) in a dummy for whether individuals
felt the economic situation of their household had become worse. Table 2 also
shows the proportion of individuals that said the economic situation had become
worse in each country. Table 2 shows that there is a good amount of variation also
in this respect.
Perceptions of the government’s role in the crisis are captured by two variables.
On the one hand, to assess the impact of perceptions on specific policy issues, we
asked the following question about support for government actions with respect to a
specific policy area: unemployment. We coded as 1 those that were unsatisfied with
the way the government was dealing with unemployment and 0 the others. On the
other hand, to evaluate the influence of blame assignment, we asked the following
question about responsibility for the problems: Which of the following do you think
are most responsible for the [country]’s economic difficulties? We coded as 1 those
selecting ‘‘national government’’ and 0 all others (banks and financial actors, US,
European Union, trade unions, migrants, and other). Satisfaction with the
government on unemployment and blaming the government for the state of the
economy are only weakly correlated at 0.13 (p\ 0.000).
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Two macroeconomic variables aim to examine both negative and positive
indicators of the economic context. They control for the potential impact that
economic hardship, at the aggregate level, has on political behaviour, as posited for
example by relative deprivation theory (Grasso and Giugni 2016b). On the one
hand, high unemployment levels are perhaps the most pernicious consequence of the
current economic crisis in Europe. Countries where unemployment is highest, are
those that in general have suffered the most from the current economic crisis. On the
other hand, we also examine GDP growth as this is perhaps the clearest measure that
a country is doing well and is coming out of recession. Countries with positive and
large GDP growth figures are understood to be out of recession and to have curbed
the most pernicious effects of the economic crisis. Both variables are taken for 2014
in order to examine conditions prior to participation but not too far back in time. On
the policy side, we include two variables linked to austerity policies: the
government expenses for social policies (as a percentage of the GDP) and the tax
wedge (as a percentage of labour cost). These two variables reflect the definition of
austerity policies as reducing government spending, especially in the social realm,
and increasing taxation, especially on labour. Research has pointed to the role of
public policies as part of the political opportunity structure affecting protest
participation (Giugni and Grasso 2015b; Meyer 2004). In this perspective, these two
variables control for the potential impact of political opportunities. Again, both are
for 2014. In addition, we also control for the effect of different political systems by
including Gallagher’s disproportionality index. This also captures the fact that
voters in different systems might find it easier or harder to assign responsibility for
specific policy outcomes to the incumbent, depending on the institutional setup.
We also include in our models the following classic individual-level controls (for
more details see, e.g. Dunn et al. 2014; Grasso et al. 2017; Saunders et al. 2012):
age, gender, education level (low), occupation (manual), employment status
(whether the respondent is unemployed), political interest, internal and external
political efficacy, party attachment, left–right values, libertarian–authoritarian
values, number of organisational memberships (distributions by country for all
dependent and independent variables are provided in Table 2). Socio-demographic
characteristics, political attitudes, and organisational involvement have long been
shown to play an important role for political participation (Brady et al. 1995; Brady
1999), including party attachment for voting (Campbell et al. 1960). Moreover,
research has often argued that more progressive values underpin extra-institutional
political participation (Dalton et al. 2010; Welzel and Deutsch 2012).
Our dependent variable is measured at the individual level but we have
independent variables at both the individual and the country level. For this reason,
we specify multilevel models with random intercept coefficients to take into account
the two-level nature of the data (country and individual). This model is useful to
correct for the within-country dependence of observations (intraclass correlation)
and adjusts both within and between parameter estimates in relation to the clustered
nature of the data (Snijders and Bosker 1999). Since our dependent variables are
dichotomous, we estimate logistic multilevel models with a Gaussian link function.
Although the issue is the object of a debate among methodologists, we use
multilevel modelling even if the number of level-2 units is towards the lower end.
M. Giugni, M. T. Grasso
For this reason, we also ran fixed effects models to check for robustness of our
results. The results from the latter were effectively the same as those from the
multilevel models, so we present the random effects models as a more elegant way
of displaying the results and allowing also for the inclusion of the level-2 controls.
Moreover, since we hypothesise that the effect of relative deprivation is conditional
upon perceptions of the government’s role in the crisis—that is, the way people
frame it in terms of blame assignment and satisfaction with the way the government
is dealing with unemployment—we include in the models, in turn, two interaction
terms aimed at capturing these effects.
Results
Tables 3, 4, 5, and 6 show the results of our analysis. Each table refers to one of the
four types of political behaviour under scrutiny: voting against the incumbent,
attending public meetings, participating in demonstrations, and joining strikes. We
focus our comments on the main effects of satisfaction with the way the government
deals with unemployment and of blame assignment (Models 3–5), as well as on the
interactions of these two variables and feelings of relative deprivation (Models 6
and 7). The main effects allow us to test our first and second hypotheses, while the
interactions allows for examining the evidence for our third hypothesis.
Starting with the main effects, both satisfaction with the way the government
deals with unemployment and blame assignment have a significant positive effect
on the likelihood to vote against the incumbent (Table 3). Results show that people
do not vote for the incumbent when they suffer from poor economic conditions, they
think the government is responsible for negative economic conditions in the
country, and they are dissatisfied with how it has dealt with the unemployment.
Perhaps most importantly, dissatisfaction with the way the government is dealing
with the crisis—specifically, with regard to unemployment—has the largest effect,
while reducing the effect of relative deprivation when included in the model,
showing that perceptions of the government’s role in the crisis underlie the key
mechanism at work here.
Moving to the three non-electoral forms of participation, we see that people
unsatisfied with the way the government deals with unemployment are more likely
to attend political meetings, while blame assignment does not seem to matter
(Table 4). A similar pattern can be observed for participation in demonstrations
(Table 5). As far as the main effects of our two variables are concerned,
dissatisfaction with the way the government deals with the crisis displays a
significant effect, while blame assignment is not significant. This effect, however, is
much less important than for not voting for the incumbent. Finally, joining strikes
does not seem to be influenced by dissatisfaction with the way the government deals
with the crisis nor by blame assignment, as neither of these two variables has a
significant effect (Table 6).
Thus, the analysis of the main effects provides some evidence supporting the first
and second hypotheses. As we expected, we observe a direct effect on political
behaviour of dissatisfaction with the way the government is dealing with
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Blame and contention: how perceptions of the government’s role…
unemployment and of blaming the national government for the nation’s economic
difficulties. However, such an effect varies across types of political behaviour, being
strongest for the more institutionalised forms, and more specifically for voting
against the incumbent, that is, for the electoral form. The more contentious forms of
political behaviour are less influenced by perceptions of the role of the government
in the economic crisis.
If we look at the interaction terms (third hypothesis), we observe a significant
effect of the interaction between relative deprivation and dissatisfaction with the
way the government deals with the crisis in the case of voting against the incumbent
(Table 4). This means that the effect of relative deprivation on economic voting is
conditional upon believing that the government has not dealt with the crisis in a
satisfactory way. We also observe a significant interaction term in the case of
attending political meetings (Table 4). Again, dissatisfaction with the way the
government deals with the crisis significantly interacts with relative deprivation.
Like for voting against the incumbent, although to a lesser extent, here the effect of
relative deprivation seems to be conditional upon perceptions of the role of
government in the crisis. More specifically, the effect of government performance
on unemployment is significant also in the case of attending political meetings. In
contrast, the interaction between relative deprivation and blame assignment is not
significant either for voting against the incumbent nor for attending political
meetings. Furthermore, none of the two interactive terms displays a statistically
significant effect on participating in demonstrations and joining strikes, indicating
Fig. 1 Plot of interaction between relative deprivation and dissatisfaction with how government deals
with unemployment on voting against the incumbent. Note adjusted predicted means based on Model 6 in
Table 3
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that there is no conditional effect of perceptions of the government’s role in the
crisis on the relationship between feelings of relative deprivation and involvement
in these more contentious forms of political behaviour. Our third hypothesis is
therefore confirmed only in part, namely for the two more institutional form of
political behaviour and in the case of the conditional role of dissatisfaction with
government performance, while blame assignment does not seem to matter here.
Conditional effects can be seen more clearly in Figs. 1 and 2, which show the
plots of the two statistically significant interaction terms. Here we can better
appreciate the direction and size of such effects. As we can see, the conditional role
of perceptions of the role of government, while present both in the case of voting
against the incumbent and in the case of attending political meetings, is particularly
visible for the latter. This can be seen by comparing the slope for those who feel
deprived with the slope for those who do not feel deprived. The latter is nearly flat,
whereas the former shows a strong effect of relative deprivation on this form of
political behaviour. In brief, overall we can see that dissatisfaction with the way the
government is dealing with unemployment matters both for those who feel deprived
and for those who do not feel deprived. However, the former are more likely to
engage than the latter, especially so when it comes to attending political meetings.
This pattern, furthermore, is present only in the more institutionalised forms of
political behaviour, whereas relative deprivation does not interact with perceptions
of the role of government in the economic crisis when it comes to the more
contentious forms.
Fig. 2 Plot of interaction between relative deprivation and dissatisfaction with how government deals
with unemployment on attending public meetings. Note adjusted predicted means based on Model 6 in
Table 4
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Conclusion
The deep economic crisis suffered by many European countries in recent years has
spurred much scholarly writing on the impact of this particular crisis and of
economic crises in general (for e.g. see English et al. 2016; Giugni and Grasso
2017b, c; Grasso and Giugni 2016a; Temple et al. 2016; Temple and Grasso 2017).
In this paper, we have explored a number of potential effects on different types of
political behaviour, which can all be seen as the political expression of
dissatisfaction with the current political and economic situation, using an original
dataset stemming from a survey conducted in nine European countries. We were
particularly interested in investigating the impact of perceptions of the govern-
ment’s role in the crisis (as measured through satisfaction with the way the
government is dealing with unemployment, and blaming the government for the
economic situation of the country), as well as their interaction with perceptions
about one’s own economic conditions in terms of relative deprivation (as measured
through the feelings that the economic situation of the household is worse than
5 years earlier). Moreover, we have looked at the effects of these predictors and
their interactions on various forms of political behaviour: an electoral form captured
by voting against the incumbent and three non-electoral kinds of participation,
namely attending public meetings, participating in demonstrations, and joining
strikes.
Our findings suggest that perceptions of the government’s role in the crisis are
instrumental in pushing people to manifest their disapproval politically. At the same
time, however, the impact of these variables is not homogeneous across all forms of
political behaviour, as for some—in particular, voting against the incumbent—they
matter, while not so for other modes. Most importantly, we found evidence that the
perceptions people have of the way in which the government is dealing with the
situation, more precisely on the way in which it is dealing with unemployment—a
key aspect of the economy in times of crisis—conditions the effect of relative
deprivation on political behaviour. This occurs namely with voting against the
incumbent and with attending public meetings, that is, the more institutionalised
forms of political behaviour, whether electoral or non-electoral.
While we expected such a conditional effect to occur for other forms as well, the
variations we observed both in the main effects and in the interaction effects across
forms of political behaviour allow us to stress another important point. This is to say
that different forms of political behaviour are influenced by different factors. In
other words, the economic crisis led people to participate politically, but in different
forms and for different reasons pertaining to the way they perceived the crisis and
its effects.
Finally, on a more methodological note, our study shows the need to go beyond
the traditional distinction between electoral and non-electoral political behaviours
and also to consider certain forms of electoral behaviour such as voting against the
incumbent as a form of adversarial political action alongside other forms such as
attending a meeting, demonstrating, or participating in a strike. We argue that the
political context of an action has important repercussions for how we understand it
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in terms of its contentiousness. As others before us have argued (Heaney and Rojas
2014; Hutter 2014; Kriesi 2014; McAdam and Tarrow 2010), electoral politics and
protest politics need to be studied together in order to arrive at a better
understanding of why and how citizens hold governments to account, both in
times of crisis as well as in more ‘‘ordinary’’ times.
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